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REVIVING THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE CONCEPT AND APPLYING 
IT TO INFORMATION PRIVACY POLICY 
PRISCILLA M. REGAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Three policy narratives in the 1980s and 1990s largely determined the 
path that information privacy policy would take.  The first was the dominance 
of the individual rights definition of the problem of information privacy.  
Second was the Reagan administration’s deregulation perspective, which was 
followed by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) stepping 
back from regulation in the “public interest, convenience and necessity.”  
And third was the Clinton administration’s admonition not to stifle 
innovation as the Internet developed.  All three of these narratives are being 
challenged by events in the early part of the twenty-first century.  The view 
that privacy is not only an individual right, but also a right that is important 
to society as a whole, has received more support in policy, philosophical, and 
legal literatures—and has called into question the effectiveness and relevance 
of policy based on the Fair Information Principles (“FIPs”).  At the same 
time, the deregulatory policies of the Reagan administration have largely 
evolved into new forms of concentration in a number of industries—
including those in the information and communication sectors—and have 
raised questions as to whether some of these companies have achieved the 
status of providing necessary or essential services and thus should be 
regulated.  Finally, there is now a question of whether those who benefitted 
from the earlier era of free rein are now hampering Internet innovation by 
operating to stifle, or buy-up, new startups. 
The quest in this Essay is inspired, in large part, by Ithiel de Sola Pool’s 
1983 analysis of the convergence of communications technologies, which 
had heretofore been regulated under three distinct regimes of print, common 
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carriage, and broadcasting.  De Sola Pool’s analysis raises the question of 
what regime should provide the framework for communications policy of the 
future, particularly as applied to Internet communications.  For Pool, 
The outcome to be feared is that communications in the future may 
be unnecessarily regulated under the unfree tradition of law that 
has been applied so far to the electronic media.  The clash between 
the print, common carrier, and broadcast models is likely to be a 
vehement communications policy issue in the next decades.  
Convergence of modes is upsetting the trifurcated system 
developed over the past two hundred years, and questions that had 
seemed to be settled centuries ago are being reopened, 
unfortunately sometimes not in a libertarian way.1 
Pool’s primary concern was that speech remain free and unfettered from 
regulation in the new electronic era, as was truest under the print regime.  
Arguably, speech has remained generally free on the Internet and in 
electronic communications, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s holding 
that the provisions of the Communications Decency Act designed to censor 
Internet material violated the First Amendment freedom of speech.2  And, 
arguably, commercial speech has been somewhat privileged, especially 
online advertisements and targeted messages to consumers—with the effect 
that the privacy of consumers has been compromised.  Although the conflict 
between free speech and privacy is not the focus of my analysis, it is 
instructive to note that this perceived conflict established an early line of 
policy discourse and provided legal, and even constitutional, rationales 
against strong information privacy policy and, in effect, may have closed off 
a path to a different approach to information privacy protection.3 
                                                          
 1.  ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 7–8 (1983). 
 2.  See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864–85 (1997); Ira Glasser, The Struggle for a 
New Paradigm: Protecting Free Speech and Privacy in the Virtual World of Cyberspace, 23 NOVA 
L. REV. 627, 646 (1999). 
 3.  Eugene Volokh voiced the concern that information privacy protections would endanger 
free speech by restricting the ability of others to communicate information about us and that free 
speech was the higher value to protect.  See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information 
Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 1049, 1123–24 (2000).  Both Paul Schwartz and Julie Cohen provided important and 
insightful responses to Volokh’s analysis.  Schwartz emphasizes that FIPs that require non-
disclosure of information “help maintain the boundary between public discourse and the other 
realms of communication” and “safeguard deliberative democracy by shaping the terms of 
individual participation in social and political life.”  Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information 
Privacy: Eugene Volokh’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559, 1563–64 
(2000).  Cohen, in turn, argues, “[i]n the sense that counts for First Amendment purposes, 
personally-identified data is not collected, used or sold for its expressive content at all; it is a tool 
for processing people, not a vehicle for injecting communication into the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”  
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1373, 1414 (2000) (citing Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99 (2000)). 
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This Essay proceeds in four parts: First, this Essay provides a brief 
review of information privacy policy and practices and their relevance and 
effectiveness in today’s information environment (such as big data, the 
Internet of Things, individual convenience compromising public 
convenience).  Second, the Essay analyzes communications deregulation to 
identify key principles and to determine whether these are relevant to today’s 
environment.  Third, this Essay examines the current status of the Internet 
landscape; and fourth, provides a preliminary investigation of whether and 
how the public trustee concept might be applied to information privacy 
policy. 
I.  INFORMATION PRIVACY POLICY AND PRACTICES 
The shortcomings of the current approach to information privacy law in 
the United States are generally and broadly recognized.4  The current model, 
based on the FIPs, places the burden on individuals to monitor organizations 
in order to ensure that their information is accurate, complete, and used only 
for the purposes to which the individual has agreed.  Although organizations 
are to give notice of their practices, such notice is often in the form of long, 
lawyerly statements that few read in either online or offline forms.5  Updating 
or replacing FIPs has received renewed attention as information practices 
move from individual records to big data analytics.  Additionally, there is 
increased recognition that privacy is not just important to the individual but 
                                                          
 4.  See, e.g., Robert M. Gellman, Fragmented, Incomplete, and Discontinuous: The Failure 
of Federal Privacy Regulatory Proposals and Institutions, 6 SOFTWARE L.J. 199 (1993); Paul M. 
Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815 (2000); Daniel J. Solove, 
Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 
(2013); Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal 
Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033 (1999). 
 5.  Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Notices, 4 
ISJLP 543 (2008).  In their research, McDonald and Cranor found that the national opportunity cost 
for the time to read privacy policies is in the order of $781 billion, or seventy-six work days a year, 
given that the average American encounters almost 1,500 privacy notices a year.  See id. at 552–65; 
Alexis C. Madrigal, Reading the Privacy Policies You Encounter in a Year Would Take 76 Work 
Days, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/reading-
the-privacy-policies-you-encounter-in-a-year-would-take-76-work-days/253851/.  
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also is important to society more generally6 and takes on some of the 
characteristics of a public good.7 
The modern personal information economy has revealed the weaknesses 
of looking at privacy as a private good, or individual value, for which isolated 
individuals can bargain and negotiate to obtain the level of privacy protection 
that they desire.  Instead, the information asymmetries of the personal 
information market, as well as the actions of other individuals, render it 
impossible for individuals either to procure reliable and complete 
information on the implications of revealing their information or to ensure 
that the actions of others will not implicate their privacy.  On social 
networking sites, one’s own privacy is dependent upon one’s friends, friends 
of friends, professional colleagues, affinity sets, and others who have access 
to that individual’s personal information.  The actions of one person affect 
the privacy of others in that group.8  The other way in which users expose 
data about one another is more complicated and less directly attributable to 
the actions of others with whom one actually interacts.9  This is the landscape 
of big data where “individuals cannot know what the data they reveal means 
when aggregated with billions of other data points.”10  Ira Rubinstein notes 
that the information extracted from big data “is not only unintuitive and 
unpredictable, but also results from a fairly opaque process.”11 
Recently, a number of scholars have begun rethinking how the current 
status of personal privacy might best be conceptualized in a way that moves 
                                                          
 6.  Chapter 8 of my 1995 book, Legislating Privacy, set out one of the earliest arguments for 
the social importance of privacy and suggested three bases for its social importance: privacy’s 
common value, its public value and its collective value.  PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING 
PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 213 (1995).  A number of scholars 
have also recognized and further developed the social importance of privacy: Valerie Steeves, Helen 
Nissenbaum, Paul Schwartz, Beate Roessler, Paul Ohm, Daniel Solove.  For the most recent writing 
on this, see SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Beate Roessler 
& Dorota Mokrosinska eds., 2015).  
 7.  See Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385 
(2015); see also Dennis D. Hirsch, Privacy, Public Goods, and the Tragedy of the Trust Commons: 
A Response to Professors Fairfield and Engel, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 67 (2016); Priscilla M. Regan, 
Response to Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 51 (2016). 
 8.  Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and Externalities, 6 
ISJLP 425, 428–29 (2011). 
 9.  See also Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run Around Anonymity and 
Consent, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 44 
(Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014); Paul Ohm, Changing the Rules: General Principles for Data Use and 
Analysis, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 96 
(Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014); Priscilla M. Regan, Big Data and Privacy, in ANALYTICS, POLICY 
AND GOVERNANCE 204 (Jennifer Bachner et al. eds., 2017). 
 10.  Fairfield & Engel, supra note 7, at 390. 
 11.  Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3 INT’L DATA 
PRIVACY L. 74, 76 (2013). 
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beyond the individual rights and FIPs approach.  A central component of this 
rethinking is to realistically examine the economics or market context in 
which personal privacy is negotiated, which logically and inevitably draws 
attention to the market failures, making it difficult, if not impossible, for 
individuals to protect their own privacy.12  These market failures include, for 
example, the asymmetries in information about the flows of personal 
information, lack of transparency regarding data exchanges, and lack of 
knowledge about short-term and long-term implications and costs to the 
individual.  The existence of such market failures, joined with the recognition 
of a social or public value of privacy, justifies thinking about privacy as a 
public good. 
Scholars are currently pursuing at least four lines of analysis to 
conceptualize privacy as containing a collective or public good value and a 
different approach to protecting privacy.  The first is to stress the negative 
externalities that result from the way that personal information is currently 
collected, used, and exchanged, and thus, explore how the tools and practices 
of environmental protection might be incorporated into personal information 
protection.13  The second is to view the personal information landscape as 
experiencing a “tragedy of the commons.”  I have argued elsewhere that 
personal information can be viewed as a “common-pool resource,”14 whose 
value to any one user is curtailed by other users because the common pool 
resource system is overloaded in that the collection of more personal 
information drives up the costs to both data subjects and users; polluted in 
that inaccurate, irrelevant, and out-of-date information contaminates the 
resource pools; and over-harvested in that more users take similar pieces of 
information from the pool, reducing the unique value of that information for 
any one user.15  Somewhat similarly, the third way of conceptualizing a 
public good value of privacy is to draw attention to how the personal 
information landscape has resulted in the “tragedy of the trust commons.”16  
Finally, the fourth is to use tools and analysis from behavioral and 
experimental economics to identify the negative externalities or spillovers 
                                                          
 12.  See, e.g., Fairfield & Engel, supra note 7; A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass 
Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1713; Hirsch, supra note 7; Regan, supra note 7. 
 13.  Froomkin, supra note 12; Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What 
Privacy Regulation Can Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2006). 
 14.  See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 30 (1990). 
 15.  Priscilla M. Regan, Privacy as a Common Good in the Digital World, 5 INFO. COMM. & 
SOC’Y 382, 400 (2002). 
 16.  Hirsch, supra note 13, at 29–30. 
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that individuals create in their own actions and to empower groups to protect 
privacy.17 
Given the weaknesses of the current regulatory or, more accurately, self-
regulatory, approach and the increasing appreciation for privacy’s social 
importance, serious thinking about an appropriate public policy approach that 
recognizes the broad social value of information privacy is needed.  I propose 
that the old model of public trustee, as applied, for example, to Ma Bell in 
the Communications Act of 1934 and as found in notions of fiduciary 
responsibility, is likely to be relevant again in today’s personal information 
environment with large, concentrated firms providing multifaceted and 
interlocking services for individuals and organizations. 
II.  LOGIC OF COMMUNICATIONS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION 
Although a detailed review and analysis of the history of 
communications and telecommunications policy is far beyond the scope of 
this Essay, it is instructive to consider the traditional principles that guided 
policy in this area—and the logic for changing those principles in the mid-
1980s.  Such a review will reveal whether and, if so, which principles may 
be relevant in today’s Internet environment. 
From the Radio Act of 1927 until the deregulatory wave of the 1980s, 
broadcasting regulation under both the Federal Radio Commission (“FRC”) 
and the FCC was based on the standard of the “public interest, convenience, 
and necessity.”18  Although the vagueness of this standard was recognized at 
the time, the general idea was to establish the fundamental principle that 
would help guide the development of the industry in an area where 
technology was likely to change and evolve.19  As an author of the Radio Act 
of 1927 stated at the time: 
[I]n the present state of scientific development . . . licenses should 
be issued only to those stations whose operation would render a 
benefit to the public, are necessary in the public interest, or would 
contribute to the development of the art. . . . [T]he broadcasting 
                                                          
 17.  Fairfield & Engel, supra note 7. 
 18.  See generally Glen O. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins 
and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 
3, 14 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989). 
 19.  Id. at 18. 
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privilege will not be a right of selfishness.  It will rest upon an 
assurance of public interest to be served.20 
The Act borrowed from the public utility model of regulation and 
characterized broadcasters as “‘public trustees’ who were ‘privileged’ to use 
a scarce public resource”—the public airwaves and the broadcast spectrum.21  
The emphasis was that licensed broadcasters had, in effect, “social 
responsibilities.”22  The overall goal was to ensure that “the interest, the 
convenience, and the necessity of the listening public,” and not that of “the 
individual broadcaster or the advertiser,” was “first and foremost.”23  We will 
return to these principles in the final part of the Essay but first need to briefly 
examine how they played out over time. 
In the late 1970s and continuing in the 1980s, under Chairman Mark 
Fowler, the FCC began to revisit the traditional interpretation of the public 
interest with respect to the communications industry and to emphasize that 
regulation was only necessary “when the marketplace clearly fails to protect 
the public interest, but not when there is only a potential for failure.”24  At 
this time, the FCC set a higher threshold for regulation, reasoning that the 
increase in the number of broadcasting stations and other communications 
providers nullified the scarcity of the airwaves rationale for regulation.  What 
the FCC saw instead was that particular stations were meeting the needs of 
particular segments of the public, and thus there was less need for one station 
to serve the interests of all listeners or viewers.25  Additionally, the FCC 
believed that the public service role was part of broadcasters’ culture and that 
the audience would demand that broadcasters serve the public,26 which also 
lessened the need and rationale for government regulation.  Democratic 
members of Congress, such as Edward Markey (D-MA) and John Dingell 
(D-MI), disagreed with the FCC’s deregulatory moves, retaining the 
perspective that broadcasters were “licensees and trustees of the public 
airwaves” who should serve the public interest and that the market was not 
able to compel broadcasters to carry out these responsibilities.27 
                                                          
 20.  Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The “Public Interest” Standard: The Search for 
the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 609 (1998) (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 5479 (1926) 
(statement of Rep. White)). 
 21.  Id. at 610. 
 22.  Id. at 626. 
 23.  Id. at 611 (quoting FED. RADIO COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 166 (1928)). 
 24.  Id. at 616. 
 25.  Id. at 632. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 145, 150 (1993) (citing Straight Talk from Chairman Dingell, BROADCASTING, Feb. 16, 
1987, at 31). 
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Telecommunications also experienced a deregulatory wave in the 
1980s.  Nicholas Economides recounts that, historically, regulation, 
predominantly in the guise of anti-trust regulations, was seen as appropriate 
in the telecommunications sector for four reasons: the market could not bring 
about competitive outcomes; deviation from economic efficiency was 
socially desirable; social and private benefits were distinct; and there was a 
need to coordinate technical standards.28  The 1934 Telecommunications Act 
laid the groundwork for federal regulation and established the FCC’s 
jurisdiction over telecommunications as a common carrier service.29  Until 
1981, AT&T dominated all aspects of US telecommunications—local and 
long-distance lines and revenue, equipment (Western Electric), and research 
(Bell Labs)—and achieved near monopoly status.30  Although the public 
interest objective was somewhat vague, regulators agreed that basic local 
phone service or “universal service” was desirable and even necessary from 
a public interest perspective.31  By the 1970s, more than ninety percent of 
U.S. households had telephone service.32  However, the Justice Department 
alleged that AT&T and the Bell system acted to limit competition through its 
monopoly on equipment, long-distance service, and local service and brought 
a major antitrust suit against AT&T in 1974, resulting in a settlement in 1984 
in which AT&T retained the long-distance network and divested itself of 
seven regional telephone companies.33  This settlement recognized that local 
telecommunications services had the characteristics of a natural monopoly 
while competition would likely flourish in long distance services.34 
The story of telecommunications deregulation is fascinating but far too 
complex and intricate to convey in depth here.  It is relevant to examine the 
trajectory of public interest concepts, however, so a brief overview is 
appropriate.  The 1996 Telecommunications Act attempted to restructure the 
                                                          
 28.  Nicholas Economides, Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction, in THE LIMITS 
OF MARKET ORGANIZATION 48, 50 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 2005). 
 29.  Robinson, supra note 18, at 3, 18.  The term “common carrier” has a long legal history 
dating back to Roman law and English common law with the intent of conveying that a service was 
open to the general public without discrimination.  Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 
regulated telecommunications services as common carriers.  Eli Noam identified “the following 
factors are important in determining common carriage: [s]ervice is regular[;] [c]ustomers are not 
readily predictable and are changeable[;] [t]he carrier solicits business from the general public, for 
example by advertising[; and] law and regulations define the responsibilities of the parties.”  Eli M. 
Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common Carriage, 18 TELECOMM. 
POL’Y 435, 437–38 (1994). 
 30.  Economides, supra note 28, at 55.  
 31.  Id. at 51–52. 
 32.  Id. at 54. 
 33.  Id. at 54–55. 
 34.  ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFTER THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A MORE 
COMPETITIVE ERA 8–9 (1991). 
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U.S telecommunications sector and to “preserve and advance universal 
service,”35 which included high quality service at low rates, access to 
advanced services in all states, rural access, and access to advanced services 
for schools, health care facilities, and libraries.36  These goals continue to 
guide the expansion of broadband Internet services in the United States37 and 
have recently led the FCC to reclassify internet service providers (“ISPs”), 
or providers of broadband Internet access service (“BIAS”), as 
telecommunications providers.  Previously, ISPs were classified as 
“information services” under Title I of the 1996 Telecommunications Act,38 
but the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order reclassified them as 
telecommunications providers, services, or “common carriers” under Title II 
of the Communications Act and Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996.39  This reclassification broadens the FCC’s authority to regulate 
certain aspects of the activities of ISPs in the tradition of a responsibility to 
operate in the “public interest.” 
III.  THE LANDSCAPE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY INTERNET 
As the Internet began to evolve from a community of researchers to a 
global commercial network, the U.S. government made a conscious policy 
decision to step back and let it evolve without government regulation.  In 
outlining the Clinton administration’s position as reflected in the report of 
the National Information Infrastructure (“NII”) Task Force, Vice President 
Gore provided five principles to guide policy: 
 Encourage Private Investment 
 Provide and Protect Competition 
 Provide Open Access to the Network 
 Take Action To Avoid Creating a Society of Information 
“Haves” and “Have Nots” 
 Encourage Flexible and Responsive Governmental Action40 
                                                          
 35.  Economides, supra note 28, at 65 (quoting Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254(b) 
(2012)). 
 36.  Id.   
 37.  Priscilla M. Regan, Oh What a Tangled Web: Implementation of Broadband Assistance 
Grants, in GOVERNING UNDER STRESS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OBAMA’S ECONOMIC 
STIMULUS PROGRAM 85, 85 (Timothy J. Conlan et al. eds., 2017). 
 38.  Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 39.  In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601, 2015 WL 1120110 
(2015); see also Open Internet, FED. COMM. COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/general/open-internet 
(last visited May 17, 2017) (providing background information and documents). 
 40.  Al Gore, U.S. Vice President, Remarks Delivered at the Superhighway Summit (Jan. 11, 
1994), https://clinton1.nara.gov/White_House/EOP/OVP/other/superhig.html; INFO. 
INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., THE GLOBAL INFORMATION 
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Privacy was one of several topics discussed by the NII Task Force and, 
in April 1997, it released an options paper for public comment raising the 
question of how best to implement FIPs “that balance the needs of 
government, commerce, and individuals, keeping in mind both our interest in 
the free flow of information and in the protection of information privacy?”41  
The Task Force noted the possibility that “demand could foster a robust, 
competitive market for privacy protection. . . . [and] that privacy could 
emerge as a market commodity in the Information Age,” but also discussed 
the ways in which the government could facilitate the development of a 
privacy market and enforce self-regulation, and the possibility of the creation 
of a federal privacy entity.42  Based in part on the report of the Task Force, 
the Clinton Administration’s Framework for Global Electronic Commerce 
concluded: “We believe that private efforts of industry working in 
cooperation with consumer groups are preferable to government regulation, 
but if effective privacy protection cannot be provided in this way, we will 
reevaluate this policy.”43 
Since these early discussions, the prevailing policy approach in the 
United States has been one of limited government regulation over both 
classic market conditions (entry, exit, price) and over privacy protections.  
But there is increasing recognition that competition on the Internet has 
actually concentrated power in the hands of a few key actors—particularly 
ISPs and what are referred to as “edge intermediaries,” such as Facebook and 
Google.  Likewise, there is increasing recognition that self-regulation has not 
effectively protected online privacy and that a privacy market has not 
evolved.44  Instead, individuals’ private information has been commodified 
and, through online advertising, provides the foundation for “free” websites.  
As Frank Pasquale similarly points out: 
 It would be nice to believe that market forces are in fact 
promoting optimal levels of privacy.  It would also be comforting 
                                                          
INFRASTRUCTURE: AGENDA FOR COOPERATION (1995), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/1995/ 
global-information-infrastructure-agenda-cooperation. 
 41.  INFO. POLICY COMM., NAT’L INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, OPTIONS FOR 
PROMOTING PRIVACY ON THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1997), 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/options-promoting-privacy-national-information-infrastructure. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  THE WHITE HOUSE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, 
https://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.html (last visited May 17, 2017) (emphasis 
added).  
 44.  See, e.g., Peter Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the 
Protection of Personal Information, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE (U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce ed., 1997), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/1997/privacy-and-self-
regulation-information-age; Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal 
Data Protection: Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061 (2009).  
 2017] REVIVING THE PUBLIC TRUST CONCEPT 1035 
 
if antitrust law indirectly promoted optimal privacy options by 
assuring a diverse range of firms that can compete to supply 
privacy at various levels (and in various forms).  But this position 
is not remotely plausible.45 
With respect to large Internet actors, particularly the ISPs but also 
Apple, Google, and Facebook, the key policy question is how best to 
characterize the roles they currently play.  Are these companies, for example, 
establishing the infrastructure of modern communication?  Are they 
providing essential services in conducting modern lives?  Do they provide 
the foundations over which daily communications and transactions occur?  
These questions regarding the implications of the size and scale (global) of 
these companies, as well as the pivotal roles they play in modern life, have 
generated something of a rethinking of whether free market competition and 
a largely hands-off role by government regulators is still appropriate.  If the 
answers to these questions are affirmative, then some form of government 
regulation acknowledging those roles can be justified. 
Several privacy scholars have recently begun to engage in analysis of 
how these firms and their role in modern economic and social life should be 
defined; they more often than not conclude that the role of these firms is 
critical and not easily substituted by other companies or actors.  Jeffrey 
Rosen, for example, points out that “social norms are not something that 
Facebook reflects.  On the contrary, Google and Facebook have a crucial role 
in shaping those social norms.”46  Taking a somewhat different approach, 
Pasquale argues that these firms are: 
less services than they are platforms for finding services (and, 
occasionally, goods).  Facebook, Google, and even Internet service 
providers (“ISPs”) might be thought of less as sellers of particular 
end services than as advisors or gatekeepers, or connectors 
between users and what they want.  In this intermediary role, 
Internet companies are far closer to health insurers or mortgage 
brokers than they are to sellers of products or services.47 
Deborah Johnson and I similarly raised questions about the status of 
both Google and Facebook.48  If Google is a search engine with a mission of 
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delivering knowledge (along the lines of a twenty-first century library), then 
we might consider Google as something like a public utility or quasi-public 
trust.  Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that, at the same time as 
delivering “free” knowledge to its users, Google is also delivering users as 
products to its paying customers: advertisers.49  With respect to Facebook, 
we asked whether it is “the Ma Bell of the twenty-first century—and should 
it be regulated as such? . . . [H]as Facebook become public space, and should 
it be regulated in accordance with public trustee principles?”50 
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, Paul Ohm cited four justifications for requiring ISPs (BIAS 
providers) to provide a higher standard of protection for information privacy: 
the history of common carriers’ responsibility “to respect the privacy of the 
information they carried”; the “relative lack of choice” consumers have; the 
“privileged place” ISPs have in the network (gatekeeper, bottleneck); and the 
sensitivity traditionally accorded information such as communications, 
reading habits, and location.51  Ohm noted that other online entities 
demonstrate some of the same characteristics such as social networking sites 
that “carry exceptionally sensitive information and exhibit network effects 
and insufficient data portability that limit customer choice and exit.”52 
There is some interest on Capitol Hill, in the regulatory agencies, and in 
the states in revisiting how to classify these firms and what policy approach 
is warranted given their size and scale.  Congressional committees held a 
number of hearings on a possible antitrust approach to Google in September 
2012.  In February 2012, thirty-six state attorneys general addressed the 
dominant position that Google has in both the search engine and email 
environments, and the lack of choice consumers actually have: “It rings 
hollow to call their ability to exit the Google products ecosystem a ‘choice’ 
in an Internet economy where the clear majority of all Internet users use—
and frequently rely on—at least one Google product on a regular basis.”53 
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Both the FTC and FCC have recently come close to imposing more 
regulations on these large actors as illustrated by the FTC’s antitrust 
investigations of Google,54 and the FCC’s consideration of whether its net 
neutrality rules empowered it to impose requirements on Google, Facebook, 
and other Internet companies, as well as ISPs.55  Although neither the FTC 
nor the FCC took action against these “edge players,” it is likely that more 
such proposals will be made in the near future. 
The question now is how best to provide for effective information 
privacy protection in this new landscape of the twenty-first century Internet.  
Traditional self-regulation with occasional prodding from government 
agencies, congressional committees, consumer and privacy groups, and state 
attorneys general has yielded not only a patchwork of laws and regulations, 
but also an inexplicable morass of confusion for the individual.56 
IV.  NEW CONCEPTS FOR INFORMATION PRIVACY PROTECTION—PUBLIC 
TRUSTEE 
In this final Part of the Essay, I will argue that the public trustee 
regulatory regime, rather than the anti-trust regime or the environmental 
externality regulatory regime, will provide a more robust path to effective 
information privacy protection.  Three arguments provide the rationale for 
this conclusion: First, the large online players are operating at the scope and 
scale where “public interest, convenience, and necessity” demand that they 
be more regulated.  Second, a public trustee approach avoids the somewhat 
messy issues of proving “concentration” and anti-competitive behavior 
entailed in antitrust regulation.  Third, the public trustee approach draws upon 
the link between privacy and trust that has emerged from public opinion 
surveys and the academic literature on privacy. 
The first argument for a public trustee type of regulatory regime entails 
a realistic recognition, as noted above, of the size, scale, and influence of 
these so-called “edge players.”  Evidence for this comes in sheer numbers 
alone.  Facebook reported in November 2016 that about 1.8 billion people 
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around the world log on to Facebook every month.57  According to a Pew 
survey, forty-four percent of adults in the United States report that they get 
their news from Facebook.58  The implications of the role of platforms or 
edge providers have been most starkly apparent in the recent debates 
regarding the role that Facebook and Google played in spreading “fake news” 
during the 2016 election.  News report after news report59 criticized the 
influence these companies had and the fact that that influence was generated 
by algorithms that few understand and by a business model that would appear 
to enable, if not reward, fake news.  Zeynep Tufekci pointed out in an op-ed 
in the New York Times that: 
 Only Facebook has the data that can exactly reveal how fake 
news, hoaxes and misinformation spread, how much there is of it, 
who creates and who reads it, and how much influence it may have.  
Unfortunately, Facebook exercises complete control over access to 
this data by independent researchers.  It’s as if tobacco companies 
controlled access to all medical and hospital records.60 
Similarly, Farhad Manjoo wrote: “It’s time to start recognizing that 
social networks actually are becoming the world-shattering forces that their 
boosters long promised they would be—and to be unnerved, rather than 
exhilarated, by the huge social changes they could uncork.”61 
To this point, platforms have themselves assumed some responsibility 
for policing or controlling the content on their sites.  In the mid-2000s, the 
deputy general counsel at Google had the authority and responsibility for 
determining, both for Google in the United States and Google in other 
countries, what content could be displayed and what could not.62  This role, 
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referred to as the “Decider,” placed enormous decisionmaking power over 
what people around the world would see and not see, and control over when 
and how people could speak or when they would be censored.  Although this 
power was generally used rather wisely at the time, as Jeffrey Rosen argues: 
“You might be uncomfortable with the idea of allowing a single woman, a 
Decider, to make these incredibly contextual and difficult free speech 
decisions for the globe, but the truth is that this Decider model, as inadequate 
as it may be, may be better than the alternatives.”63  From a policy options 
perspective, the alternatives have not been fully explored yet, for a number 
of reasons, the time for exploring options seems to be now. 
Both privacy protections and content regulation are central to the 
principles of “social responsibility” that underlined the original rationale for 
public trustee regulation.  The evidence seems to demonstrate that self-
regulation and a system of privacy notices does not effectively protect 
information privacy.  The evidence also seems to show that self-regulation 
or no regulation is not effective to ensure content that does not undermine the 
integrity of something as fundamental to the democratic process as a 
presidential election.  Thus, some regulation to ensure that companies serve 
the “public interest, convenience and necessity” seems justified. 
A second argument for a public trustee type of regulatory regime is that 
it avoids the often-messy arguments entailed in antitrust regulation.  Such 
arguments often get entangled in lengthy court cases and settlements, rely on 
detailed and unfathomable financial analyses, and are opaque for the 
American public.  Beginning in 2010, both the FTC and the European Union 
(“EU”) engaged in a number of antitrust investigations, including whether 
Google was acting in an anticompetitive manner and prioritizing search 
results towards Google-owned companies.  Given the difficulties of finding 
clear and convincing evidence of discriminatory behavior and practices 
towards competitors, and the difficulties of predicting the dynamics of the 
innovative information marketplace, antitrust allegations are fraught with 
challenges.64 
Such challenges played out in the FTC investigation of Google which, 
after three years of gathering evidence, holding hearings, and analyzing the 
complex record, resulted in some minor concessions on Google’s part but no 
formal charges.  By 2016, the European Commission had pursued five 
different antitrust investigations into Google, three of which resulted in 
formal charges.  All indications are that the EU will not back off its inquiries 
and that countries such as France, where there is litigation over the “right to 
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be forgotten,” and Italy will continue to scrutinize Google’s activities.65  In 
mid-2016, the FTC appeared to be considering reopening its investigation as 
a result of criticisms that Google is not a neutral gateway to information on 
the Internet.  At an April 2015 congressional hearing, Senator Richard 
Blumenthal (D-Conn.) spoke as follows to the possibility of renewed FTC 
investigations: “While the company is a great American success story, their 
position in the marketplace has led to legitimate questions about whether they 
have used their market power to disadvantage competitors unfairly and 
ultimately limit consumer choice.”66 
Given the enormous time investment and significant financial and 
personnel costs that antitrust investigations entail for both government 
regulators and companies such as Google and Facebook, it may be to the 
advantage of both to pursue a less adversarial path to resolving these 
questions.  In this sense, both regulators and companies may prefer to 
consider whether a public trustee style regime provides advantages.  The 
FCC’s recent actions with regard to privacy requirements for ISPs based on 
the sensitivity of the information—as well as requirements for transparency, 
data security, and data breach notifications—may provide a trial assessment 
to see whether an alternative such as this would be more advantageous than 
the antitrust route.67  Both Google and Facebook successfully resisted being 
included in the FCC’s privacy actions, but depending on how the FCC 
regulations play out, it is possible that a change on the companies’ part and/or 
on the part of consumer and privacy advocates may result in inclusion of such 
edge players. 
A third argument for the public trustee approach is that it acknowledges 
the importance of the fundamental connection between privacy and trust that 
has been demonstrated to be necessary in the information economy and 
Internet landscape more generally.  Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog 
make an interesting argument, consistent with my proposal here, to refocus 
privacy from a protection against bad things to an enabler of trust 
relationships, which would benefit both data subjects and data holder.68  They 
apply the principle of “fiduciary duties” in much the way that I am thinking 
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of public trustee in that they would similarly move privacy principles “from 
procedural means of compliance for data extraction towards substantive 
principles to build trusted, sustainable information relationships.”69  As they 
convincingly point out: 
Rather than encouraging trust, modern American privacy law 
encourages companies to profit in short-sighted ways by extracting 
as much value as possible from personal data in the short term.  As 
long as companies don’t cause a narrow set of legally recognized, 
largely financial harms, they are essentially free to set up the terms 
of information relationships any way they wish.70 
Public opinion surveys from the 1980s onwards reveal that the public 
does not trust organizations “to collect and use information about people like 
you in a responsible way,” with the lowest levels of trust in sectors that 
Americans associate with data collection and monitoring.71  Such trust is not 
only important to individuals who are data subjects but also to the 
organizations collecting this information and is critical to both overall trust 
in government and trust in the digital economy.  As Hirsch points out: 
Overall user trust in the digital economy is not only a vital 
resource; it is also an open-access, partially rivalrous one.  No one 
can fence it off.  Particular companies may enhance, or deplete, 
overall user trust in society. . . .  But, in the absence of laws or other 
forms of social control, [particular companies] cannot prevent 
others from dipping into the well of overall user trust, or from 
diminishing it through abusive behaviors.72 
The asymmetries in the data subject-data holder dynamic and the 
essential role that trust plays in this relationship have long been recognized, 
have gotten worse over time, and need to be readdressed.  In analyses of a 
number of complex systems designed for purposes of surveillance or 
transparency, we found, “trust relationships are often ill defined or 
incompletely understood and trust is often compromised . . . .  The individual 
becomes caught in a web of cascading mirrors, sending her into relationships 
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over which she has no control, no expectations, and no basis of trust.”73  With 
an emphasis on data holders as public trustee, a concern with identifying and 
justifying “privacy harms” would not be part of policy discussions, as also 
pointed out by Richards and Hartzog.74  Rather than focusing on the negative 
effects of information collection and use, policy discussions would shift 
attention to determining what kinds of information practices serve a public 
interest in an information economy. 
Finally, I will consider some of the implications of an information 
privacy regulatory regime based on public trustee principles of “public 
interest, convenience and necessity.”  As noted above, the current privacy 
protection regime based on the FIPs and self-regulation overburdens the 
individual with tasks that are unrealistic, resulting in a system that is 
ineffective, causes cynicism and frustration among individuals, requires 
episodic prodding by federal regulators with inadequate power, and 
oftentimes leaves companies in a defensive and uncertain position.  Under 
such circumstances, no one wins—not the individual, not the government, 
and not the companies.  At the same time, further analysis of the personal 
information environment leads many to conclude that information privacy 
actually has many of the characteristics of a public good, which provides a 
rationale for rethinking a public trustee approach for protecting information 
privacy.  So how might this play out? 
First, it is important to recognize that, to some extent, such a shift 
actually entails something of a rethinking of Internet governance more 
generally.  The development of the Internet has been something of a work in 
progress—without top-down planning and largely dependent on cooperative 
arrangements among self-identified affected private and public parties.  The 
principles and regulations guiding this organic development have largely 
emerged through the process of development—first, by primarily addressing 
administrative (such as, system of domain names) and technical (such as, 
interoperability) concerns.  More social principles were regarded as unwise 
and irrelevant, as perhaps best articulated in John Perry Barlow’s A 
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, which says to the 
governments of the world: 
We believe that from ethics, enlightened self-interest, and the 
commonweal, our governance will emerge.  Our identities may be 
distributed across many of your jurisdictions.  The only law that all 
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our constituent cultures would generally recognize is the Golden 
Rule.  We hope we will be able to build our particular solutions on 
that basis.  But we cannot accept the solutions you are attempting 
to impose.75 
The reality that evolved over the twenty years since this was written is 
quite different than what the pioneers of Cyberspace envisioned.  Rather than 
a parallel universe for virtual communities providing more freedom and 
creativity than the physical world, Cyberspace has developed as an adjunct 
of the physical world dominated and organized by the same large 
organizations that exist in that world. 
Second, perhaps more appropriately termed “hopefully,” the process of 
formulating information privacy policies—as well as those for free content 
regulation and law enforcement or intelligence access—would be less 
adversarial under a public trustee regime.  Rather than long drawn out 
lawsuits with zero-sum stakes, a focus on the social responsibility of large 
Internet players might redirect attention from particular, competing 
stakeholder interests to the broader common or shared interests of all parties.  
To a certain extent, the development and roles of privacy officers76 in private 
and public organizations illustrate the type of dynamic that might emerge 
under a public trustee regime—but with their role elevated and substantiated 
by government sanctions and oversight in a more cooperative corporatist 
process than either self-regulation or government regulation entail.  How this 
might develop will require more research and analysis, but seems to be a path 
worth pursuing. 
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